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Abstract
At ITW’10, Bringer et al. suggest to strengthen their previous identi-
fication protocol by extending the Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) prob-
lem to identification codes. We first extend security results by Tillich et
al. on this very problem. We then prove the security of this protocol
using information theoretical arguments.
Keywords. CRE, Identification Codes.
1 Introduction
At Indocrypt’09, Bringer et al. [3] introduce a new identification protocol based
on the use of identification codes [1]. Their proposal, denoted here the BCCK
identification protocol, relies on a construction of identification codes by Moulin
and Koetter [12] using Reed-Solomon codes. In a few words, the BCCK iden-
tification protocol can be described as followed (cf. Figure 1, in [3] a low-cost
contactless device (CLD) and its reader want to mutualy authenticate them-
selves).
The CLD stores two secret polynomials P, P ′ of degree less than k known
only by the Reader; to authenticate itself to the CLD, the reader proves the
knowledge of P by sending 〈i, P (αi)〉 where αi is the i-th element of Fq. The
CLD proves its identity by replying with 〈P ′(αi)〉.
Reader CLD
Pick i
〈i,a=P (αi)〉
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ a
?
== P (αi)
P ′(αi)
?
== b
〈b=P ′(αi)〉
←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 1: BCCK Identification Protocol [3]
[3] proves the security and the privacy properties of their protocol relying on
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a classical cryptographic assumption known as the Polynomial Reconstruction
(PR) problem [7–10].
We here want to switch from this computational perspective to an informa-
tion theoretical one.
On one hand, a first attempt was made in this direction by [11] where some
recommendations are made to reach this more stringent goal. On the other
hand, [2] introduces an extension of the BCCK identification protocol, simply
considering that the underlying Reed-Solomon codes stay unknown from the
adversary who has thus to solve the Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) prob-
lem [4–6,13] to recover the initial parameters of the BCCK identification proto-
col. This restriction on what is available to the adversary does not modify the
underlying structure of the BCCK identification protocol.
In this paper, we show that, in fact, an adversary cannot solve this CRE for
identification codes. Our results are based on those of [6]. We consider different
cases taking into account the noise over the channel and the capacity of the
adversary to isolate or not the communications of a CLD.
2 Related Works
2.1 Code Reverse Engineering Problem
The Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) problem [4–6,13] corresponds to the sit-
uation where an observer tries to retrieve information from an eavesdropped
communication without any specific prior knowledge on the encoding represen-
tation of the transmitted data.
In the CRE problem, it is assumed that the adversary knows the length n of
the encoded messages and a subset of codes of length n. Then by eavesdropping
several messages over a noisy channel, he tries to determine from which code
they are generated.
Definition 1 (Code Reverse Engineering problem [6]) Let C be a family
of codes of given length n and given rate R.
• Let C be a code chosen randomly in C and x1, . . . , xM be M random code-
words to be transmitted over the communication channel.
• Given the received words y1, . . . , yM , the problem is to guess which C has
been used.
The difficulty depends on the number of received words, the level of noise and
the rate of the codes. In [6], the authors analyze the number of eavesdropped
messages that is needed to achieve a correct guess with good probability.
Let V andW be two random variables. Let H(V ), respectivelyH(V |W ) and
I(V ;W ), denote the binary entropy of V , respectively the conditional entropy
of V given W , and the mutual information of V and W . When assuming that
the codewords are chosen independently and that the channel is memoryless,
we have the following result.
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Lemma 1 ( [6]) The conditional entropy H(C|y¯) of C given y¯ = (y1, . . . , yM )
is lower bounded by
log2(#C)−M(I(x; y)− I((x; y)|C))
with x one of the xi and y the corresponding yi.
This implies that the closer the mutual information I((x|C); (y|C)) and I(x; y)
are, the harder to guess C is.
Thanks to Fano’s inequality, [6] estimates also how large M should be to
achieve a good guess of C with negligible error probability when n and #C
go to infinity; this needs M ≃ log2(#C)(I(x;y)−I((x;y)|C)) . The result is then exploited
for linear codes with rate below the channel capacity (i.e. with overwhelming
probability to decode correctly a received word when n large) and for regular
LDPC codes.
2.2 Identification Codes
Let X ,Y be two alphabets, η the message length, and W η a channel from X η
to Yη, defined as a conditional probability law: W η(y|x) is the probability to
receive a message y ∈ Yη given a transmitted message x ∈ X η. By extension,
for a given subset E ⊂ Yη, W η(E|x) is the probability to receive a message
belonging to E when x has been transmitted.
Definition 2 (Identification Code, [1]) A (η,N, λ1, λ2)-identification code
from X to Y is given by a family {(Q(·|i), Di)}i with i ∈ {1, . . . , N} where:
• Q(·|i) is a probability distribution over X η, that encodes i (the encoding
set of i is defined as the set of messages x for which Q(x|i) > 0, in other
words, the set of messages likely to encode i),
• Di ⊂ Y
η is the decoding set,
• λ1 and λ2 are the first-kind and second-kind error rates, with
λ1 ≥
∑
x∈X η
Q(x|i)W η(Di|x)
and
λ2 ≥
∑
x∈X η
Q(x|j)W η(Di|x)
(where W η(Di|x) is the probability to be in the decoding set Di given a
transmitted message x and W η(Di|x) the probability to be outside the de-
coding set)
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} such that i 6= j.
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To simplify the discussion in next sections, we restrict ourselves to the case
where error rates inequalities above are in fact equalities (i.e. the error rates
are the same for all choice of i and j).
Moulin and Koetter introduce in [12] the following identification code based
on Reed-Solomon codes.
A Reed-Solomon code over a finite field Fq, of length n < q−1, and dimension
k, is the set of the evaluations of all polynomials P ∈ Fq[X ] of degree less
than k − 1, over a subset F ⊂ Fq of size n (F = {α1, . . . , αn}). In other
words, for each k-tuple (x0, . . . , xk−1) ∈ F
k
q , the corresponding Reed-Solomon
word is the n-tuple (y1, . . . , yn) where yi =
∑k−1
j=0 xjα
j
i . In the sequel, we
identify a source word (x0, . . . , xk−1) ∈ F
k
q with the corresponding polynomial
P =
∑k−1
j=0 xjX
j ∈ Fq[X ].
Definition 3 (Moulin-Koetter RS-Identification Codes) Let Fq be a fi-
nite field of size q, k ≤ n ≤ q−1 and an evaluation domain F = {α1, . . . , αn} ∈
Fq.
Consider the collection AF,P = {(i, P (αi))| i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} for P any poly-
nomial on Fq of degree at most k − 1.
Then the Moulin-Koetter RS-Identification Codes are defined by:
• their encoding distribution Q(·|i) which is taken as the uniform distribution
over AF,P ,
• their family of encoding and decoding sets {(AF,P , AF,P )}P∈Fq[X], degP<k.
From the definition and the fact that the Reed-Solomon codes are Maximum
Distance Separable, this leads to (η = log2 n+log2 q,N = q
k, λ1 = 0, λ2 =
k−1
n )
identification codes from {0, 1} to {0, 1}.
Example 1 Throughout this paper, we take the parameters suggested in [3] for
the identification protocol of Figure 1: q = 264, n = 211, k = 28.
In the original paper, there is a limitation on the number of times a CLD can
be identified by a reader. [3] preconises that a same CLD can only be interrogated
at most 2048 times.
3 CRE for identification codes
In this section, we show how to extend the Code Reverse Engineering problem
and the bounds from Section 2.1 to the case of identification codes. This is the
first important contribution of this paper.
Definition 1 in the context of transmission codes gives the following definition
for identification codes.
Definition 4 (Identification CRE problem) Let C be a family of identifica-
tion codes (cf. Definition 2) of given parameters (η,N, λ1, λ2) from the alphabet
X to alphabet Y.
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• Let C = {(Q(·|i), Di)}i∈{1,...,N} be a code chosen randomly in C and i¯ =
(i1, . . . , iM ) be M random messages to be encoded over the channel.
• Given the received messages x¯ = (x1, . . . , xM ), the problem is to guess
which C has been used.
Remark 1 Note that we modify the original problem, replacing the encoded
messages by the messages to be encoded, to be able to address the case without
errors in the BCCK identification protocol.
With a memoryless channel, Lemma 1 is adapted accordingly as follows.
Lemma 2 For independent choices of i¯ = (i1, . . . , iM ), the conditional en-
tropy H(C|x¯) of the identification code C given the received messages x¯ =
(x1, . . . , xM ) is lower bounded by
log2(#C)−M(I(i;x) + I((x;C)|i)− I((i;x)|C)) (1)
i.e.
log2(#C)−M(H(x)−H(i) +H(i|C, x)−H(x|C, i)) (2)
Proof.As for the original proof of Lemma 1, this is based on the relation
I(i;x;C) = I(i;x) + I((x;C)|i) = I(x;C) + I((i;x)|C) where here I((x;C)|i)
is not equal to 0. As H(i) = H(i|C), this leads to log2(#C) −M(I((x;C)|i) −
I((i;C)|x)). I((x;C)|i) − I((i;C)|x) can also be simplified into H(x)−H(i) +
H(i|C, x)−H(x|C, i) as H(x|i)−H(i|x) = H(x)−H(i). ✷
One important difference with the CRE problem for transmission codes is
that the solution is not trivial for a noiseless channel. This is due to the first-
kind λ1 and second-kind λ2 error rates of the identification codes: if at least
one error-rate is non zero, then I(i;x) < H(i) whereas the mutual information
between a message and the received message would have been maximal with a
transmission code. Intuitively, what makes the problem harder for identification
codes is that the quantity of transmitted information can be very low.
Assume that the distribution is regular in the error rate inequalities of Def-
inition 2 (the same probability W holds for all x):
• The first-kind error rate λ1 implies that for a given i, we have a probability
λ1 to take a x outside the decoding set of i. This means that H(i|x,C)
would be almost equal to H(i). Consequently, with probability λ1 we have
I(i;x) ≈ I((i;x)|C).
• The second-kind error rate means that for another given message j we
have a probability λ2 to also have x ∈ Dj . This implies that H(i|x,C)
may remain high.
Corollary 1 Let X = Y = {0, 1}. For a constant size of the encoding
#{x |Q(x|i) > 0} = τ(N)2η
5
in the context of a noiseless channel. The equation Eq.(2) simplifies itself into
log2(#C)−M(log2 1/τ(N)) (3)
Proof.The equation Eq.(2) becomes
log2(#C)−M(H(x)− log2N +H(i|C, x)− log2 τ(N)2
η)
and we have H(x) ≤ η, H(i) = log2N , H(x|C, i) = log2 τ(N)2
η, and log2N ≥
H(i|x,C). ✷
We see that the greater τ(N) will be, the greater the expression (3) will be.
By using Fano’s inequality as in [6], we obtain that we need M ≃ log2(#C)log
2
1/τ(N)
for guessing C with negligible error probability when n and #C go to infinity.
M will go to infinity quickly as soon as log2 1/τ(N) is negligible compared to
log2(#C).
In case of additional noise on the communication channel, the difficulty will
increase with the level of noise (as for the classical CRE problem).
4 Application to BCCK protocol
Now comes the main contribution of our work: we use the CRE problem for
identification codes to study the security of the BCCK identification protocol
from an information theory perspective.
[11] suggests to increase the security of the identification protocol [3], which
relies on the Polynomial Reconstruction problem, by additionally exploiting the
Code Reverse Engineering (CRE) problem. The goal is to restrict further the
information available to an eavesdropper or an active adversary.
Let Fq be a finite field of size q, k ≤ n ≤ q − 1, we define C the set of the
Moulin-Koetter (η = log2 n + log2 q,N = q
k, λ1 = 0, λ2 =
k−1
n ) identification
codes. Following Definition 3, an identification code C ∈ C is defined according
some evaluation domain FC = {αC,1, . . . , αC,n} ∈ Fq with
• a family of encoding and decoding sets {(AFC ,P , AFC ,P )}P∈Fq[X], degP<k,
• where AC,P = {(j, P (αC,j))| j ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
This doing, a random code C is determined by the random choice of n elements
in Fq. The size of C is
(
q
n
)
n!.
Lemma 2 and the same analysis that for Eq. (3) with τ(N) = 1/q lead to
the following result.
Corollary 2 H(C|x1, . . . , xM ) ≥ log2
(
q
n
)
n!−M log2 q
This underlines the difficulty of the CRE problem in this setting when n
grows to infinity for M polynomial in log2 n: via Stirling’s formula, log2
(
q
n
)
n!
is approximately q log2(q/(q − n)) + n log2(q − n) = Ω(n).
6
Example 2 Taking back the values from Example 1,
this leads to (75, 264×256, 0, 1/8)-identification codes. This gives:
H(C|x1, . . . , xM ) ≥ log2
(
264
211
)
211!− 64×M.
As log2
(
264
211
)
211! is approximately equal to 217, taking M = 2048 makes the
lower bound useless.
Consequently, note that we need a more stringent result than the one we just
obtained. This motivates the introduction of a new tighter lower bound.
With the following result, which is specific to the Moulin-Koetter construc-
tion, we prove that an adversary gains no information in this situation.
Proposition 1 For the C family of Moulin-Koetter identification codes defined
as above over Fq with k ≤ n ≤ q − 1, for independent choices of M messages
P 1, . . . , PM to be encoded for a random choice of C ∈ C, we have
H(C|x1, . . . , xM ) = log2
(
q
n
)
n!
x1, . . . , xM are the received messages, independently and randomly chosen in the
encoding sets of P 1, . . . , PM , and eavesdropped by the adversary (here without
noise).
Proof.We haveH(x) = log2 n+log2 q, H(P ) = log2N = k log2 q, H(x|C,P ) =
log2 n and we know that the uncertainty on P knowing x and C corresponds to
the choice of a polynomial of degree at most k−2, i.e. H(P |x,C) = (k−1) log2 q.
✷
4.1 Validity of the independence assumption
In the protocol of [3], the messages to be encoded and the encoding messages
are not fully independent due:
1. to the relative small size of the encoding sets and the correlation between
them (one can detect if the same index j is used to encode independent
polynomials),
2. to the potential ability of an adversary to detect whether two encoding
messages are sent to the same CLD (i.e. that they are related to the same
polynomial/message to be encoded).
We study now the impact on the previous estimation.
A more general version of Lemma 2 is given below for the situation where
independent choices are not required.
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Lemma 3 Let C ∈ C be an identification code. Let i¯ = (i1, . . . , iM ) be the
variable associated to M messages to be encoded and x¯ the variable for the
corresponding received messages. We have
H(C|x¯) ≥ log2(#C) (4)
−(H(x¯)−H (¯i) +H (¯i|C, x¯)−H(x¯|C, i¯))
As H (¯i) is always greater than H (¯i|C, x¯), we obtain
H(C|x¯) ≥ log2(#C)− (H(x¯)−H(x¯|C, i¯))
Moreover, H(x¯)−H(x¯|C, i¯) ≤ H(x¯) ≤M ×H(x), thus
H(C|x¯) ≥ log2(#C)−M ×H(x) (5)
With the parameters of the identification protocol, we deduce
H(C|x¯) ≥ log2
(
q
n
)
n!−M(log2 n+ log2 q)
This means that the knowledge of the adversary, on the code C ∈ C that is used,
is still negligible when n grows to infinity for M polynomial in log2 n.
Example 3 For the parameters from Example 2, q = 264, n = 211, k = 28, the
lower bound is
log2
(
264
211
)
211!− 75×M
which remains high only for M < 1747.
We now study a tighter estimation directly from the expression (4). To
correspond to the situation where the adversary is able to determine whether
the same CLD is aimed (for instance by capturing it), assume that in i¯ =
(i1, . . . , iM ), each message i = P is repeated l times exactly. We assume that
each time a different encoded message x = (j, P (αj)) is used. We obtain for l ≤
k, the same result as before (cf. Proposition 1), whereas the entropy decreases
for l > k.
Proposition 2 For l ≤ k, H(C|x¯) = log2
(
q
n
)
n!
For l > k, H(C|x¯) ≥ log2
(
q
n
)
n!− Ml (l − k) log2 q
Proof.We apply Equation (4) with the following values:
• H(x¯) = Ml
∑l−1
j=0(log2(n− j) + log2 q)
• H (¯i) = Ml log2N =
M×k
l log2 q
• H (¯i|C, x¯) = Ml × (k − l) log2 q if l ≤ k, 0 otherwise.
• H(x¯|C, i¯) = Ml
∑l−1
j=0(log2(n− j))
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✷Following the intuition, with non independent messages, the adversary gains
some knowledge on the chosen code C ∈ C only when the order of repetition is
strictly greater than k.
Example 4 We set the same parameters as in Example 2, q = 264, n = 211,
k = 28. The lower bound is
log2
(
264
211
)
211!− 64×
M
l
(l − 256)
For instance, this remains high until about M ≤ 219 with l = 257 and M ≤ 212
for l = 512. The number of needed M to have a low lower bound decreases up
to approximately 2341 while increasing l to n.
On the one hand, this can be interpreted as follows. A passive eavesdropping
of 2048 BCCK identifications of the same CLD may enable an adversary to get
almost all information on the underlying code when M = 2341. On the other
hand, note that with only 2340 such eavesdroppings, the entropy stays very high
for the adversary.
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